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INTRODUCTION
The extraordinary rise in the last decade of Chinese
investment in Africa1 continues to be a subject of profound
curiosity.2 That is largely because it defies the centuries-old
norm on who invests where. Traditionally, the bulk of foreign
investment had flowed North-South but rarely South-South.3
Whenever and wherever it occurred, the means of its protection
ranged from direct military intervention4 to a bona fide and
1. Detailed information on China-Africa economic relations is available on the
official website of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (“FOCAC”) at
http://www.focac.org/eng.
2. See, e.g., David Smith, Hillary Clinton Launches African Tour with Veiled Attack on
China, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
aug/01/hillary-clinton-africa-china (“Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, has
started an 11-day tour of Africa by contrasting America’s commitment to democracy
and human rights with rival powers’ focus on exploiting resources. Although Clinton
did not mention any country by name, her remarks will be widely interpreted as a swipe
at China, which eclipsed the US as Africa’s biggest trading partner three years ago.”). A
growing academic literature covers this subject. See generally DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA 308 (2009) (“Where the West
regularly changes its development advice, programs, and approach in Africa . . . China
does not claim to know what Africa must do to develop. China has argued that it was
wrong to impose political and economic conditionality in exchange for aid, and that
countries should be free to find their own pathway out of poverty.”); CHRIS ALDEN,
CHINA IN AFRICA (2007); CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert I.
Rotberg ed., 2008); CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT
EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); SARAH RAINE, CHINA’S AFRICAN CHALLENGES
(Tim Huxley ed., 2009); DAVID H. SHINN & JOSHUA EISENMAN, CHINA AND AFRICA: A
CENTURY OF ENGAGEMENT (2012); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA: ENGAGEMENT AND
COMPROMISE (2006).
3. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN AFRICA REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION—AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP 24–25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2010, U.N.
Sales No. E.10.II.D.13 (Norbert Lebale et al. eds, June 18, 2010) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT], available at http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2010_en.pdf. In development discourses, the terms
“North” and “South” are typically used to signify the level of development of countries.
All African countries ordinarily fall under the South category. Id. at 1.
4. See, e.g., Louis T. Wells, Preface to THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, at xvi (José E. Alvarez et al. eds., 2011) (“In the rather distant past, the United
States and other rich countries would occasionally act militarily or insist on state-state
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equitable legal framework.5 China had experienced the full
range of treatments in its long history of dealings with the West,6
as had Africa.7 Although they went through the spectrum of
experiences independently, they seem to have been exposed to
the same set of evolving principles at about the same time in
varying degrees.8
In the Twenty-first Century, International Investment
Agreements (“IIAs”), particularly Bilateral Investment Treaties
(“BITs”), have become the principal means of protection of
foreign investment.9 These investment treaties themselves lay
along a spectrum representing the balance of power of their
own era. For example, the recently announced 2012 US BIT
Model, which is the fourth model, may be taken as an
approximate representation of the most contemporary

arbitrations when their investors claimed mistreatment abroad. Later, the United States
would threaten (and occasionally act) to cut off aid, vote against loans by multilateral
financial institutions to offending countries, and cancel trade preferences . . . .”).
5. The negotiated legal framework is dominated by Bilateral Investment Treaties
(“BITs”) in recent times. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
554–55 (2d ed. 2008).
6. See JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGNINVESTED ENTERPRISES 41–54 (3d ed, 2010). Most notable are the “unequal treaties”
signed between China and the major Western powers including the United States,
Great Britain, and France, which gave these countries extraterritorial jurisdiction in
China in matters involving their own citizens. Id. at 41–44. Currently, China has a web
of at least 126 duly negotiated BITs with a wide range of countries, including many
European countries. NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT
TREATIES 31 (2009).
7. See RICHARD ROBERTS & KRISTIN MANN, Law in Colonial Africa, in LAW IN
COLONIAL AFRICA 10 (1991) (“In the first half of the nineteenth century, the balance
of power between Europeans and Africans shifted decisively in favor of the Europeans.
Industrialization had widened the material and technological gap between their
cultures. Europeans began to feel confident for the first time that on the African coasts,
if not in the interior, they could impose their will, by force if necessary.”). Currently,
most African states order their investment relations through BITs.
8. See WON KIDANE, CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE LAW, CULTURE AND
ECONOMICS OF ARBITRATION 173–76, 188–95 (2011). For a thorough discussion of the
evolution of international investment law, see LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 469–94.
9. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 554; L. Yves Fortier, The Canadian Approach to
Investment Protection: How Far We Have Come!, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 525, 528 (Christina
Bender et al. eds., 2009) (“BITs emerged as a tool in the Cold War period to promote
FDI in developing countries.”).
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compromises that the United States is willing to make.10 China’s
BITs have also gone through at least three generational
modifications.11 China has employed all three generations to
protect its investment in Africa. Do China’s BITs tell a story of a
nation’s rapid transformation from a recipient of Foreign Direct
Investment (“FDI”) to a sender of FDI? Or do they paint a more
complicated picture?
China’s approach to investment in Africa is said to be
different from the approaches that Africa’s traditional partners
from Europe and North America have taken over the years. A
2010 UN Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)
report describes such difference in the following terms:
[I]n contrast to Africa’s relationship with traditional
partners, the new partnerships often have established
forums and dialogue platforms and are generally supported
by frequent high-level official visits. Furthermore, they are
based on the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of partner countries. Consequently, they are not
associated with policy conditionality as has been the case in
relations with traditional partners.12

It states further that:
the big Southern partners [mainly China] generally use
official flows to promote trade and investment activities in
Africa. Furthermore, Southern partners do not consider
their financial contributions to other developing countries
as aid. Rather they describe them as ‘expressions of
solidarity and cooperation borne out of shared experiences
and sympathies.’13

Although the role of China’s involvement in Africa remains
a subject of great controversy and heated debate,14 it is clear that
10. Office of theU.S. Trade Representative, 2012 United States Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty [hereinafter U.S. 2012 Model BIT], available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pd.
11. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 35.
12. UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., The Chinese in Africa: Trying to Pull Together, Africans Are Asking Whether
China Is Making Their Lunch or Eating It, ECONOMIST (U.K.), Apr. 20, 2010, http://
www.economist.com/node/18586448/print (evaluating the competing arguments).
The Economist hosts an ongoing online scholarly debate on Chinese involvement in
Africa. See Africa and China, ECONOMIST (U.K.), http://www.economist.com/debate/
overview/165 (last visited May 1, 2014). As of May 1, 2014, the score is 59% to 41% in
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Africa’s recent and unprecedented growth is not entirely
unrelated to Chinese investment and trade.15 Be that as it may,
China’s economic interest in Africa is not all that different from
Africa’s traditional partners. Its means of pursuing its economic
goals are also similar, although, as Ambassador David Shinn puts
it, China employs different tactics which might make it more
acceptable to Africa. In his own words:
[T]he United States and China use essentially the same
political, economic, military and cultural tools for
implementing their relations with Africa. The emphasis the
two countries place on these tactics, however, and the way
they implement policy varies considerably. China presents
itself more humbly in its interaction with Africa. Having
served as the leader of the Western world since the end of
the Second World War and the only superpower since the
end of the Cold War, the United States often comes across
in Africa as insensitive . . . .16

favor of Chinese involvement in Africa. See id. A New York Times Op-Ed Piece has also
discussed China’s intentions in Africa:
Despite all the scaremongering, China’s motives for investing in Africa are
actually quite pure. To satisfy China’s population and prevent a crisis of
legitimacy for their rule, leaders in Beijing need to keep economic growth
rates high and continue to bring hundreds of millions of people out of
poverty. And to do so, China needs arable land, oil and minerals. Pursuing
imperial or colonial ambitions with masses of impoverished people at home
would be wholly irrational and out of sync with China’s current strategic
thinking.
Moreover, the evidence does not support a claim that Africans themselves
feel exploited. To the contrary, China’s role is broadly welcomed across the
continent. A 2007 Pew Research Center survey of 10 sub-Saharan African
countries found that Africans overwhelmingly viewed Chinese economic
growth as beneficial. In virtually all countries surveyed, China’s involvement
was viewed in a much more positive light than America’s; in Senegal, 86
percent said China’s role in their country helped make things better,
compared with 56 percent who felt that way about America’s role. In Kenya,
91 percent of respondents said they believed China’s influence was positive,
versus only 74 percent for the United States.
Dambisa Moyo, Op-Ed., Beijing, a Boon for Africa, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/opinion/beijing-a-boon-for-africa.html.
15. KIDANE, supra note 8, at 3–4 & n.3.
16. Id. at 18 (quoting David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, George Wash. Univ.,
Comparing Engagement with Africa by China and the United States at the China in
Africa Symposium (Mar. 6–7, 2009), available at https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/
bitstream/handle/2022/3466/China%20in%20Africa%20Symposium%20-%20the%
20good%20one.pdf?sequence%C2%BC1).
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The current China-Africa economic engagement is full of
benefits and risks arguably to both sides.17 The legal
infrastructure for the management of such risks is in a state of
development. The principal legal instruments designed for this
purpose are the BITs that China has already entered into with
thirty-three African States.18 The principal objective of this
Article is to analyze and contextualize these BITs in light of
contemporary international investment law as represented by
the 2012 US BIT Model as well as most current nongovernmental models, mainly the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (“IISD”) Model.19 By so doing, the
Article presents a critical appraisal of the various Chinese BIT
models and proposes certain important modifications that
account for the unique circumstances of China-Africa
investment relations.
This introduction is followed by a concise description of
Chinese and African traditional conceptions of the ordering of
economic affairs by law, in order to set the stage for a more
detailed discussion of the evolution, doctrinal foundation, and
contents of the existing legal framework in Part II. Part III
juxtaposes the current China-Africa BITs against the most recent
US and IISD BIT models and attempts to identify useful
contemporary formulations and normative supplements. Part IV
provides a summary of conclusions and recommendations.

17. UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 3
(“Despite the potential benefits to Africa from South–South cooperation, it should be
noted that the new partnerships also present challenges for the region. For example,
there are concerns that it could result in a deterioration of governance and
environmental quality and also hamper efforts to achieve debt sustainability in the
region. Given these concerns, it is clear that the ultimate impact of South–South
cooperation in Africa will depend on the extent to which African countries are able to
maximize the benefits while minimizing any potential risks.”).
18. For a list of China’s BITs with all countries as of June 1, 2013, see Full List of
Bilateral Investment Agreements, UNCTAD (June 1, 2013) http:// unctad.org/Sections/
dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf. Thirty-two out of the more than 120 Chinese BITs are
with African states. Of the 32, 13 have come into effect. Id. But see Bilateral Investment
Treaty, CHINESE MINISTRY COM. (Nov 15, 2011), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
article/bilateralchanges/201309/20130900300306.shtml (listing fifteen China-Africa
BITs having come into effect).
19. Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., IISD Model International Agreement on
Investment (Apr. 2005), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_
agreement.pdf [hereinafter IISD BIT Model].
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I. CHINESE AND AFRICAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORDERING
OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BY LAW
The widespread reception in the Eastern world and Africa
of Western notions of law and legal institutions in the last
century gives the appearance that, by now, such notions are
deeply ingrained in the legal cultures of these societies.
Although there is a grain of substance to the appearance, a
closer look suggests that the respective societies’ indigenous
notions about the role of law and legal institutions in ordering
human behavior in general and economic relations in particular
remain significant.20 As a background to the detailed discussion
of the doctrinal foundations and contents of the various
generations of China-Africa BITs in the next Part, this Part
discusses the differences in legal cultures and puts the
contemporary China-Africa efforts in ordering their investment
relations by law in context.
A. The Conception of Law and Legal Obligations in China
An attempt to systematically unpack the various historical
influences that have shaped the Chinese legal culture is a
difficult and unnecessary exercise for purposes of this Article. It
is important to note, however, that the current Chinese legal
culture is a product of centuries of domestic and foreign
philosophical influences. The most well-recognized of all
influences is that of Confucian legal thought.21 The principal
assumptions underlying this thought include: positive law
encourages the evasion of rules and does not encourage proper
behavior and fails to bring about harmony; good behavior
cannot be imposed but must come from within the person;
emphasis must be placed on the duties of the person rather than
his rights; social hierarchy must be respected as it is the key to
stability; inability to resolve disputes amicably is a sign of

20. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 559–76 (3d ed. 1985);
see also Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West
Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 427, 431 (2001).
21. See generally JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNASTIC CHINA:
A SYNOPSIS OF CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY IN THE THIRTY CENTURIES FROM ZHOU TO QING
32–52 (2005).
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weakness and law suits must be avoided as much as possible; and
the application of positive law often leads to arbitrary justice.22
As Professor James Nafziger writes:
[T]he Confucian ideal of harmony on earth, where no
aberrant behavior will occur, led to an initially elitist
etiquette of propriety (li) that increasingly influenced the
entire Chinese legal system. On the other hand, for the
common people, the Chinese Legalists offered the
deterrent of positive law (fa). As time went on, the two
concepts fused. This fusion has survived with alternating
emphasis on fa and li through the dramatic history of the
Middle Kingdom. Today, the Chinese continue to be
concerned about propriety and attitudinal change just as
they are intent on rapidly developing formal codes of law.23

Chinese legal culture is also a product of years of foreign
influences.24 External influences came in many different forms,
some welcome, others not. Most notable are the extraterritorial
privileges, which exempted foreign nationals in China from
Chinese legal process and subjected them to their home states’
laws25 and related Western demand for reform as well as
Marxism-Leninism,26 and investment-related legal reforms
following China’s opening up its economy for foreign
investment in 1978.27 Despite such foreign influences, the
traditional notions still predominate. As Dean McConnaughay
22. See generally ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 36–38. For a more complete account,
see HEAD & WANG, supra note 21.
23. James A. R. Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang, Chinese Methods of Resolving International
Trade, Investment, and Maritime Disputes, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 619, 624 (1987).
24. See generally GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE
LAW 1–17 (1996); Weng Li, Philosophical Influences on Contemporary Chinese Law, 6 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 327–35 (1996).
25. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 42. Citizens of Russia, Great Britain, the United
States, France, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium,
Italy, Austria-Hungary, Peru, Brazil, Portugal, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland had such
privileges at different times. Id. at 42–43 n.17 (citing Harold Scott Quigley,
Extraterritoriality in China, 20 AM. J. IN’T’L. L. 46, 51 n.21 (1926)). See Shih Shun Liu,
Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline, in STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
LAW 840 (1925) for a discussion of the concept.
26. Following the takeover of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) in 1949, the
Chinese version of Marxism and Leninism became dominant. At its core, it disfavored
the use of law and legal institutions for the ordering of any affairs. See ZIMMERMAN,
supra note 6, at 51–53.
27. See id. at 41–54. For more discussion on the post-Mao reforms in China, see
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 3–4 (1999).
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puts it, despite long-standing commercial relations with the
West, “[t]he penetration in Asian societies of Western legal
traditions and values is not deep.”28 One of the reasons
McConnaughay cites is that:
[N]ot only was law traditionally not a significant factor with
respect to the ordering and performance of commercial
relationships in Asia, its relatively recent enactment and
application to this sphere of activity was essentially
externally inspired as a condition of commerce with the
West and, as such, unaccompanied by the fundamental
change in individual attitudes and values essential to the
determinative role of law and contracts in commercial
affairs in the West.29

It is with this important note that China’s attempt to use law
to order its investment relations with Africa must be understood.
In fact, as will be elaborated further in subsequent Parts, this
might partly explain China’s approach to the signing and
utilization, or the lack thereof, of investment treaties with
African states.
B. The Conceptions of Law and Legal Obligations in Africa
As Judge Elias puts it, in pre-colonial African societies,
customary law “strives consciously to reconcile the disputants in
a lawsuit, [unlike] English law [which] often tends to limit itself
to the bare resolution of the conflict by stopping at the mere
apportionment of blame as between the disputants.”30 With the
advent of colonialism, however, as Roberts and Mann suggest,
“material advancement and evangelical revival strengthened the
belief of most Europeans in the moral superiority of their own
civilization. Westerners equated standard of morality with
standard of living, and they found both wanting in Africa.”31
They add further that:
The new faith of Europeans in the moral and material
superiority of their own civilization convinced them that
exporting their culture would be good for Africans. Trade

28.
29.
30.
31.

McConnaughay, supra note 20, at 431.
Id.
T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 268–89 (1956).
ROBERTS & MANN, supra note 7.
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in agricultural commodities and conversion to Christian
religion were, of course, to be the agents of change.
These fundamental shifts in the relationship between
Africans and Europeans affected the character of legal
interaction between them . . . . Merchants, missionaries, and
officials began to assume that the spread of Western legal
arrangements was necessary to the growth of trade and
civilization. They wanted new authorities and institutions to
regulate their dealings with local people.32

The colonial powers, of course, maintained dual systems of
law for the natives and the Europeans throughout Africa. And in
this dualism, as Professor Táíwò explains, “there was no interest
on the part of those responsible for its introduction to plant the
whole seed from which a fully grown plant might have been
cultivated. Nor was there any chance that an organic system
could have been [cultivated].”33 The result was a total
disorientation upon the arrival of independence. Professor René
David describes it well when he says, “[t]he colonial powers did
declare, as a matter of principle, their intention to respect
customary law, but the actual measures implemented with a view
to guaranteeing its application resulted in its complete
deformation.”34
Finally, as Judge Elias concludes, “it is at least doubtful
whether complete uniformity will ever be achieved.”35 However,
the impact of Western legal cultures on existing legal cultures in
Africa is evident.36 But again, it is important to keep in mind
that, similar to the Chinese legal culture, African legal culture
emphasizes harmony: “[R]ather than . . . the strict enforcement

32. Id. at 11.
33. OLÚFÉMI TÁÍWÒ, HOW COLONIALISM PREEMPTED MODERNITY IN AFRICA 169
(2010). This is because the rule of law “originated as a . . . weapon in the arsenal of the
colonial authorities for the singular purpose of keeping the colonies and protectorates
safe for the colonizers and the natives in their place.” Id. For a similar argument, see
Robert J. Gordon, The White Man’s Burden: Ersatz Customary Law and Internal Pacification
in South Africa, in FOLK LAW 367, 387 (Alison Dundes Renteln & Alan Dundes eds.,
1994) (“Power is at its most durable and intense when running silently through the
repetition of institutionalized practices . . . [serving] as grids which officials can use to
justify, sort, order and reorder the elements of power they have.”).
34. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 20, at 561.
35. ELIAS, supra note 30, at 274.
36. For the specific aspects of the impact, see id. at 274–301.
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of law, its purpose[] [is] to reconcile the parties and to restore
harmonious relations within the community.”37
C. The Ordering of China-Africa Economic Relations by Law:
Contemporary Efforts
In recent years, headline news around the world routinely
announces multi-billion dollar deals between China and African
partners.38 With a tenfold increase in the last decade alone, the
amount of trade between China and Africa stood at US$166
billion by 2012,39 surpassing Africa’s trade with the United States
as of 2009.40
Africa has become a preferred destination for Chinese
investment as well. As of July 2012, about 2000 Chinese
enterprises had collectively invested US$15 billion in Africa,
which is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years.41
For example, the first China-Africa forum for local government
cooperation in 2012 welcomed 1700 delegates from forty
African countries to China.42 As indicated above, the Fifth
FOCAC Summit concluded by committing US$20 billion in
credit for Africa in three years. The most recent policy
pronouncement with respect to investment is contained in the

37. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 20, at 551.
38. See, e.g., China Pledges $20bn in Credit for Africa at Summit, BBC NEWS (July 19,
2012, 2:03 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18897451.
39. See H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s republic of China, Speech at the
Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter FOCAC Speech], available at
Wang
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/19/c_131725637.htm;
Xiaotian, Trade between China, Africa Strengthening, CHINA DAILY (July 19, 2012), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/19/content_15599626.htm
(“Trade
between China and Africa reached $160 billion in 2011, up by 28 percent from the
previous year, according to the most recent data released by the Ministry of Commerce.
In the past 10 years, bilateral trade has been growing at an average pace of 33.6 percent
per year.”). According to a report from the Ministry of Commerce, China, the trade
volume between China and Africa in 2012 was US$198.5 billion. See MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE, China-Africa Trade Volume Reached New Height (Apr. 18, 2013, 11:31 AM),
http://finance.china.com.cn/news/gnjj/20130418/1397454.shtml.
40. Moyo, supra note 14.
41. See FOCAC Speech, supra note 39.
42. Mu Xuequan, Chinese Entrepreneurs Urged to Help Boost Sino-African Ties,
FOCAC (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/jmhz/t964316.htm.
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latest Ministerial Action Plan for the years 2013–2015 issued at
the conclusion of the Fifth Beijing Ministerial conference.43

43. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, Beijing, China, July 23, 2012
[hereinafter Fifth FOCAC Action Plan], available at http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/
t954620.htm. It reads in full:
4.2 Investment and Enterprise Cooperation
4.2.1 The two sides expressed satisfaction with the steady growth of two-way
investment between China and Africa, especially the fast increase of China’s
investment in Africa in broader areas since the Fourth Ministerial Conference
of FOCAC in 2009. They maintain that this helps intensify economic links
between the two sides and boost local economic development and
employment.
4.2.2 The two sides promised to continue to encourage and support mutual
investment, and will actively explore new areas and ways to expand
investment cooperation. The two sides will continue to push forward
negotiations and implementation of bilateral agreements on promoting and
protecting investment, foster an enabling investment environment and
safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of investors of both sides.
4.2.3 The Chinese government will continue to encourage and support
capable and reputable Chinese companies to invest in Africa, and guide
Chinese companies to establish processing and manufacturing bases in
Africa, help raise the added value of African exports, and increase investment
in such service sectors as business services, transport, consulting and
management to raise the level and quality of cooperation.
4.2.4 The Chinese side will continue to make good use of the China-Africa
Development Fund and gradually scale it up to US$5 billion to strengthen
China-Africa cooperation.
4.2.5 The Chinese side will continue to support the development of
overseas business cooperation zones established in Africa and, in addition to
helping entry of Chinese and African enterprises into the zones, support
them in fitting into the strategic focus of the zones to realize faster utilization
of the zones so that they contribute towards rapid industrialization and
economic restructuring in Africa. China will encourage enterprises joining
the zones to increase links with local enterprises and communities,
strengthen technology and experience sharing on the shop floor and
enhance technology transfer and job creation.
4.2.6 The Chinese side will continue to strengthen cooperation with Africa
on technology and management, step up technological support and
experience sharing and help African countries enhance their capability for
independent development.
4.2.7 The two sides noted the positive outcomes of the Fourth Conference
of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs and will further encourage the
business communities of the two sides to strengthen cooperation. The
Chinese government will continue to guide Chinese enterprises to actively
fulfill social responsibilities and give back to the local communities.
4.3 Infrastructure Construction
4.3.1 The two sides agreed to prioritize infrastructure in China-Africa
cooperation and strengthen cooperation in transport, telecommunications,
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The most important highlights are: the commitment to
negotiate and implement bilateral investment agreements which
are designed to promote and protect investment showing the
increased importance that they have assigned to these treaties;
the plan to raise the China-Africa investment fund to US$5
billion; the continuation of the building of economic zones44 to
foster rapid economic growth; and the provision of preferential
loans to Chinese companies for infrastructure development.
These commitments show that Chinese investment in Africa will
continue at a much higher rate and that the investment is
supposed to be protected by law, specifically by bilateral
investment treaties.
II. THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT
RELATIONS
Apart from the “soft law”45 commitments enshrined in the
FOCAC Declarations and Action Plans,46 the most important

Id.

radio and television, water conservancy, electricity, energy and other areas of
infrastructure development.
4.3.2 To support Africa in achieving connectivity and integration and
developing more integrated infrastructure, China and the African Union will
establish a cooperative partnership in the design, inspection, financing and
management of projects under the Program for Infrastructure Development
in Africa and the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative,
strengthen relevant dialogue and exchanges, and provide support for the
project planning and feasibility study.
4.3.3 The Chinese government will continue to encourage capable Chinese
enterprises and financial institutions to participate in transnational and transregional infrastructure construction in Africa and provide preferential loans
to support infrastructure building in Africa.

44. Special Chinese Economic Zones (“SEZs”) are being built throughout SubSaharan Africa. Five such zones have already been approved and are under
construction. See Deborah Brautigam et al., China’s Investment in African Special Economic
Zones: Prospects, Challenges, and Opportunities, WORLD BANK ECON. PREMISE, Mar. 2010, at
1.
45. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “soft law” as “[c]ollectively, rules that are
neither strictly binding nor completely lacking in legal significance.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1193 (9th ed. 2009). For a detailed discussion of the “soft law”–“hard law”
distinction and significance, see Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft
Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 706, 707–08 (2010).
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sources of law in China-Africa investment relations are the
existing thirty-five BITs. At least sixteen of the thirty-three have
already come into effect.47 Before the provisions of these BITs
are analyzed in detail in Part III below, it is important to
consider the doctrinal foundation and the dilemma that
continues to afflict them as China attempts to balance its role as
a recipient of Western investment and as a sender of an
increasing amount of investment to Africa.
A. The Doctrinal Dilemma and Evolution of China-Africa BITs
The greatest dilemma in foreign investment has always
been the extent of protection that such investment must get.
This Part looks at these issues vis-à-vis China-Africa investment
relations.
1. The Doctrinal Dilemma
In 1938, writing to the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Mexico in relation to Mexico’s expropriation of agrarian
property owned by Americans, US Secretary of State Cordell
Hull said:
The taking of property without compensation is not
expropriation. It is confiscation . . . . We cannot question
the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals
in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic
concern. But we cannot admit that a foreign government
may take the property of American nationals in disregard of
the rule of compensation under international law.48

Mexico obviously rejected any notion that foreign nationals
could have superior property rights,49 endorsing what is
46. All of the declarations and Action Plans of the last ten years containing
commitments on trade and investment are available on the FOCAC website at
http://www.focac.org/eng/.
47. All the China-Africa BITs and their statuses are listed on the official website of
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Commerce at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
bilateralchanges/201309/20130900300306.shtml.
48. Letter from U.S. Secretary of State to Mexican Ambassador to the United
States (July 21, 1938), excerpted in LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 476–77.
49. Id. at 477 (“My Government maintains [that] . . . there does not exist in
international law any principle universally accepted by countries, not by the writers of
treatises on this subject, that would render obligatory the giving of adequate
compensation for expropriations of a general and impersonal character. Nevertheless,
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commonly called the Calvo Doctrine, which rejects any notion
that foreign investors could have a better right to property than
nationals.50 As the US Supreme Court noted in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino,51 “[t]here are few if any issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the
limitations on a state’s power to expropriate the property of
aliens.”52 This question is rooted in the varying conceptions of
the function of the right to private property itself. The
conceptions range from the purely laissez-faire function of
private property which gained its best articulation in a series of
cases that the US Supreme Court passed in an era dubbed the
Lochner era.53 Highly influenced by Western enlightenment
philosophers such as Hobbes,54 Locke,55 Montesquieu,56 and
Mexico admits, in obedience to her own laws, that she is indeed under obligation to
indemnify in an adequate manner, but the doctrine which she maintains on the
subject, which is based on the most authoritative opinions of writers of treatises on
international law, is that the time and manner of such payment must be determined by
her own laws.” (alteration in original)).
50. A good expression of the Calvo Doctrine, named after its Argentine
proponent, Carlos Calvo, is contained in the following passage:
It is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the same
right to protection as nationals, but they ought not to lay claim to a
protection more extended. If they suffer any wrong, they ought to count on
the government of the country prosecuting the delinquents, and not claim
from the state to which the authors of the violence belong any pecuniary
indemnity . . . . The rule that in more than one case it has been attempted to
impose on American states is that foreigners merit regard and privilege more
marked and extended than those accorded even to the nationals of the
country where they reside. The principle is intrinsically contrary to the law of
equality of nations.
DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 17–19 (1955), quoted in LOWENFELD, supra note 5,
at 473 n.13.
51. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
52. Id. at 428.
53. This era covers roughly the time period between 1890 and 1937. The most
important cases during this era include: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(striking down a New York law prohibiting bakery work for more than sixty hours a
week on grounds that it violates the rights of the contracting parties to freely enter into
any type of contract regardless of the possible harm to the workers); Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466 (1898) (striking down a Nebraska law relating to a minimum railway fare);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that a manufacturing
monopoly of ninety-eight percent of the country’s sugar refining may not be
prohibited).
54. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). His major work is typically considered to be
Leviathan (1651).
55. John Locke (1632-1704). His major work included Two Treatises of Government
(1690), which was instrumental in the drafting of the US Declaration of Independence.
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Rousseau,57 this notion emphasizes the inviolability of the right
to property. On the opposite side of this spectrum lies the
Marxist conception of property, which directly links the
ownership of means of production to the “exploitation of man
by man.”58
Some variations of the latter conception seem to have had
more acceptance in the traditional Chinese as well as African
societies. Confucian emphasis on social obligations rather than
individual rights, for example, and the pursuit of communal
harmony is believed to have had an enduring influence on
Chinese society down through the ages.59 The customary African
notions of property are similar. A Nigerian Chief once aptly
described it as follows: “I conceive that land belongs to a vast
family of which many are dead, few are living, and countless
members are unborn.”60 Judge Elias notes that these
conceptions are common to many African societies.61
Although it is difficult to directly link traditional notions of
property to developments that occurred in the post-colonial era
in China and Africa, it is not surprising that the Marxist
conception of property made more sense to the Chinese and
African societies. Indeed, in the post-colonial period, no
political ideology has had a more profound influence in the
Chinese62 and African societies.63 As China, still officially a
56. Charles Montesquieu (1689–1755). His major work was The Spirit of Law
(1748).
57. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). His major work was The Social Contract
(1762).
58. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 24 (D.
Ryazanoff ed., Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., Atheneum Publishers 1963) (1848).
59. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 36–38. Recent modifications are sometimes
called “Neo-Confucianism.” See, e.g., MACCORMACK, supra note 24, at 3. The basic
conceptions seem to have endured.
60. ELIAS, supra note 30, at 162 (quoting a statement made by a Nigerian chief to
the West African Lands Committee in 1912).
61. Id. at 162 & n.1.
62. See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investment in China: Chimera of Protection
and Predictability?, 34 VA. J. IN’T’L. L. 615, 625 (1994) (“After the Communist regime
took control of the government in 1949, it began a nationalization and expropriation
process. While political circumstances are very different today, the fact that some of the
current Chinese leaders were part of the early party power structure suggests that these
events may be of more than mere historical interest. In 1936, there were over $3.48
billion in foreign investments in China. Japan and Great Britain led in total
investments, followed at some distance by the United States and France. After the
Communist revolution, China began a ‘“slow motion nationalization’” program
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communist state,64 pursues a state-led, socio-capitalist economy,
which started with its opening-up policy in 1978,65 and many
post-colonial Africa states attempt to do the same,66 their
respective existing economic systems are as complicated as their
respective societies and defy easy classification. In addition to
the ideological underpinnings, practical considerations also
dictate the contents of investment treaties that China is entering
into with its Western as well as African partners. But, how do
these long-standing notions of ownership of private property
and the novelty of the new South-South economic partnership
get expression in the investment treaties? It is a difficult
question because ordinarily investment treaties are negotiated in
North-South economic partnerships, which almost invariably
represent competing notions of the function of private
ownership of property and the extent of its protection from
government intervention. Regardless of their success rate,
Southern partners, who are almost invariably the recipients of
the investment, have traditionally focused on their right to
regulate while the Northern partners aggressively negotiated
BITs that provided the maximum possible protection to their
investment. China and Africa share similar philosophical
viewpoints, not only regarding the function of property, but also
concerning negotiated investment treaties with their wealthier
resulting in the virtual termination of all direct foreign investment by 1957.” (citations
omitted)).
63. Beverly I. Moran, Homogenized Law: Can the United States Learn from African
Mistakes?, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 361, 367 (2001) (citing MICHAEL HODD, THE
ECONOMIES OF AFRICA 34–35 (1991)).
64. See, e.g., CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY general program (2012) (China), available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_
27138030.htm (“The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the
Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action.”).
65. That year, the new leaders of China adopted a policy called a “socialist system
with Chinese characteristics.” At the time, the new leader, Deng Xiaoping, said: “It
does not matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” GALLAGHER
& SHAN, supra note 6, at 5 (citing China’s Communist Revolution, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/deng.htm
(last visited May 1, 2014)).
66. Moran, supra note 63, at 367. For a comprehensive discussion of the nature
and current state of the African economy and its pitfalls, see CHARLES ROXBURGH ET
AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LIONS ON THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF
AFRICAN ECONOMIES (June 2010), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/
africa/lions_on_the_move.
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Northern partners from the standpoint of maintaining the
broadest possible regulatory authority for decades. A related
question looks at the extent that China and Africa have taken
these factors into account in their direct BIT negotiations. In
exploring the answers to these questions, Part II.A.2 below looks
at the evolution of Chinese investment treaties, which sheds
some light on the evolution of the Chinese economy itself and
its role in the world economic order.
2. Generational Development of Chinese BITs
Professors Gallagher & Shan divide recent Chinese foreign
investment history into four periods.67 The first period extends
from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949 to the adoption of China’s open-door policy in 1978.
During this period, although the extent of it is disputed, China
conducted the nationalization of private property and expelled
foreign investors through what is sometimes called “retaliatory
requisition.”68
During the second period, which followed its opening-up
policy and lasted until 1991, China adopted remarkable policy
changes to attract foreign investment and enacted many
investment-friendly laws.69 It also entered into many IIAs, most
notably thirty BITs, the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention,70 and the
Multilateral
Investment
Guarantee
Agency
(“MIGA”)
Convention.71 Most of the BITs signed during this period were
with European countries. During the same time, China signed
an investment insurance agreement with the United States, but

67. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 4.
68. Id. at 4–5.
69. Id. at 6. For a more detailed discussion of Chinese Investment laws, see
generally Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of China-EU Investment Relations – A Critical
Appraisal, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L 507, 507–09 (2006).
70. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 6.
71. Id. China was a member of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(“MIGA”) Convention since its entry into force in 1988. Although MIGA is not a typical
investment treaty, it provides insurance against political risk. See MULTILATERAL INV.
GUARANTEE AGENCY, http://www.miga.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
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never a BIT.72 Interestingly, China did sign a BIT with one
African country during this period, namely Ghana.73
During the third period, which spanned from 1992 to 2000,
China saw an exponential growth in foreign investment. Indeed,
FDI rose tenfold, from US$4.3 billion in 1991 to US$45.2 billion
in 1997.74 During this period, China signed sixty-six BITs and
modified the substantive and procedural contents of the
previous generation of BITs. For example, it began adopting the
principle of national treatment, to some degree.75 During this
time China signed BITs with fourteen African countries: Egypt,
Morocco, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Algeria, Gabon,
Cameroon, Nigeria,76 Sudan, Congo (Dem. Rep.), South Africa,
Cape Verde, and Ethiopia.77
The fourth and latest period, which continues to this day,
began in 2001—the year of China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”).78 This was a period that saw
consistently high levels of economic growth and
transformation.79 By the end of 2009, China was the number one
recipient of FDI for thirteen years in a row.80 It was also during
this period that China consolidated what it calls its “Going
Abroad” policy.81 The predicate for this policy was the State
Council’s July 2004 adoption of regulations simplifying Outward
Direct Investment (“ODI”) approval procedures.82 China also
set up a new sovereign wealth fund—the China Investment
Corporation (“CIC”)—with a start-up capital of US$200 billion
72. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 6 n.21. For a discussion of the history and
prospect of a China-US BIT, see Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future
of Investment Treat Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J.
ECON. L. 457, 457 (2009) (suggesting that Chinese approach to investment treaty has
been “Americanized”).
73. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, app. 1 at 419 (Africa).
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. app. 1 at 419 (Africa).
76. Id. Note that the China-Nigeria BIT that was signed in 1997 was abolished and
was resigned in 2001.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 8–9.
79. Id. at 8. In numerical terms, Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) in China rose
at the rate of eighteen percent annually, reaching US$92.4 billion in 2008.
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 2.
80. Id.
81. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 12.
82. Id. at 12.
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to invest some of the large reserves that it had accumulated over
the years.83 By the end of 2009, that capital increased to US$2.4
trillion.84
Currently, China is not only the largest recipient of foreign
investment, but also one of the largest investors of capital in
foreign countries.85 China has signed about forty-three more
BITs since it acceded to the WTO in 2001, and has initiated a
process to renegotiate the BITs that it has signed previously—
understandably to account for its transformation from a
recipient of FDI to an exporter of ODI.86 Out of the forty-three
BITs signed in the post-WTO accession period, at least sixteen
were with African countries: Congo, Botswana, Sierra Leone,
Mozambique, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Benin, Uganda,
Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Madagascar, Guinea, and
Seychelles.87 China’s total number of BITs, as of this writing, are
about 130, among which thirty-two are with African states.88
Each one of the three generations of BITs has its own
fundamental characteristics. One of each model signed with
African states is selected for detailed analysis below. Before the
detailed discussion is provided, it is important to briefly identify
the salient features of each generation. The first generation of
Chinese BITs were signed in the 1980s; the first of these BITs
was with Sweden, and indeed most were with developed states of
the West.89 These BITs are often characterized as conservative.
While they accorded Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) treatment
to foreign investors, they did not extend national treatment.90
83. See Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: China
39, WT/TPR/S/199 (Apr. 16, 2008).
84. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 2 n.4 (citing MOFCOM, http://
www.mofcom.gov.cn).
85. Comprehensive data is available at UNCTAD, COUNTRY FACT SHEET: CHINA
(2011), available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/wir11_fs_cn_en.pdf.
86. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 8–9.
87. Id. app. 1 at 420.
88. Full List of Bilateral Investment Agreements (China), UNCTAD (June 2013),
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2013).
89. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 35. Including Germany, France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Finland and Norway. Id. It was also during the same period that the
failed China-United States BIT negotiations were commenced. Id. Among the
developing countries that signed BITs with China during this time were Ghana and
Thailand. Id.
90. Id. at 37.
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Whereas they promised compensation for expropriation, the
determination of the legality of the expropriation was left for
local courts while the possibility of the determination of the
quantum of compensation by ad hoc international arbitration
was recognized.91 As a result of China’s accession to the ICSID
Convention, the most important feature of the second
generation BITs, adopted between 1990 and 1997, was the
reference to ICSID arbitration.92 Investor access to ICSID
arbitration was, however, limited to the quantum of
compensation for expropriation.93 The last and current model,
adopted in 1998, made both substantive and procedural
changes. Substantively, among other things, it added national
treatment and procedurally it accorded investors unqualified
access to international arbitration, including ICSID arbitration.94
B. China-Africa Investment Regime—A Closer Look at BITs
As indicated above, China currently has thirty-two BITs with
African states. Sixteen of them have already come into effect.95
Again, they encompass three generations of Chinese BITs: the
first generation signed from 1982 to 1989 (period of launching
of the BIT program); the second generation from 1990 to 1997
(China’s accession to ICSID); and the third generation from
1998 to the present.96
One of each is selected for analysis. China’s earliest Africa
BIT was with Ghana, which was signed on October 12, 1989, and
came into effect on November 22, 1991. The latest to come into
effect was China’s BIT with Madagascar, which was signed on
November 21, 2005, and came into effect on July 1, 2007.
91. Id.
92. Id. It is important to note that not all BITs signed during this time referenced
to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). Id.
93. Id. at 38. This was accomplished through the submission of reservations to the
ICSID Convention on the class of disputes that China agreed to submit to ICSID
arbitration. See id. at 38 n.182.
94. Id. at 39–40.
95. Full List of Bilateral Investment Agreements (China), supra note 88. The UNCTAD
database shows only twelve as having come into effect but the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Commerce lists sixteen. See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn.
96. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 35. For a detailed discussion, see Stephan
W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation of Investment Treaties of the
People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 (2007).
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Finally, the China-Ethiopia BIT has been selected, which was
signed on 11 May 1998, and came into effect on May 1, 2000.97
These three BITs represent the three generations of Chinese
BITs. This section takes a closer look at the important
substantive and dispute settlement provisions of each and puts
the existing China-Africa investment regime in perspective.
1. Scope and Admission
The first two generations of BITs represented by ChinaGhana and China-Ethiopia BITs define “investment” and
“investor” in almost identical language while the third
generation, represented by China-Madagascar, expands the
definition in some respects. The definition contained in the
China-Ethiopia BIT, which is very similar to that in the ChinaGhana BIT, includes:
(a) movable, immovable property and other property rights
such as mortgages and pledges; (b) shares, stock and any
other kind of participation in company, (c) claims to money
or to any other performance having an economic value; (d)
copyright, industrial property, know-how and technological
process; e) concessions conferred by law including
concessions to search for or exploit natural resources.98

The China-Madagascar BIT replaced copyright, industrial
property, know-how and technological process” with
“intellectual property, commercial property and industrial
property.”99 It also expanded the concessions provision by
adding “by contract” to “by law.”100 A look at China’s BIT with
Sweden, signed during the first period, suggests that the
97. The texts of China-Ghana, China-Ethiopia, China-Madagascar are available on
the UNCTAD website. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Ghana, Oct. 12, 1989 [hereinafter China-Ghana BIT], available at
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_ghana.pdf; Agreement on the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Eth., May 11, 1998
[hereinafter China-Ethiopia BIT], available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/china_ethiopia.pdf; Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, China-Madag., Nov. 21, 2005 [hereinafter China-Madagascar
BIT], available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/madagascar_china_
fr.pdf.
98. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 1; China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art.
1.
99. China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 1.
100. Id.
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concessions provision is stated a little differently. It reads: “such
business-concessions as under public law or under contract,
including concessions regarding the prospecting for, or the
extraction or winning of natural resources, as given to their
holder a legal position of some duration.”101 The use of the less
elaborate concession language in the China-Africa BITs is
surprising given China’s interest in the exploration of natural
resources in Africa.
The promotion and admission of investment provisions of
all three BITs is almost identical. The Ethiopian BIT reads in
pertinent part: “Each Contracting Party shall encourage
investors of the other Contracting Party to make investment in
its territory and admit such investment in accordance with its
laws and regulations.”102 While the admission provisions of the
China-Ghana and China-Ethiopia BITs contain a provision on
the facilitation of the issuance of visas and work permits to
investors in the contracting states, the China-Madagascar BIT,
which is the latest, omits that provision.103 Notably, the ChinaSweden BIT does not contain an admission provision. It is
exclusively focused on the treatment of investment that had
already been admitted.104
All three generations of Chinese BITs with the African
states subject the admission of foreign investment exclusively to
domestic laws.105 Presumably, the substantive non-discrimination
provisions equalize the opportunities to all foreign investors

101. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
art. 1, China-Swed., Mar. 29, 1982 [hereinafter China-Sweden BIT], available at http://
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_sweden.pdf.
102. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 2; China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97,
art. 2; China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 2.
103. See China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97.
104. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 101, arts. 1–2.
105. Investment treaties usually employ one of three pre-establishment
approaches: a top-down approach; a bottom-up approach; and a middle-ground
approach. The top-down approach applies the non-discrimination provisions to all
sectors of the economy except for those expressly excluded. The bottom-up approach
is the reverse of that, i.e., it applies the non-discriminatory provisions to specifically
identified sectors. The middle-ground approach applies the bottom-up principle to
pre-establishment and the top-down principle to post-establishment. These approaches
are discussed more fully in Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral
Investment Rules Revisited, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 119, 143–44 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds, 2008).
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barring special preferential treatments tolerated under these
treaties.
2. Treatment
The provisions designed to provide the rules for the
treatment of admitted investment are differently formulated.
The earliest provision, which is contained in the China-Ghana
BIT, is entitled “Protection of Investments and Most Favored
State Treatment.” It reads under that title:
1. Investments and activities associated with investments
of investors of either Contracting State shall be accorded
equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection in the
territory of the other Contracting State.
2. The treatment and protection referred to in
Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be less favorable than
that accorded to investments and activities associated with
such investments of investors of a third State.
3. The treatment and protection mentioned in the
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not include any
preferential treatment accorded by the other Contracting
State to investments of investors of a third State based on
customs union, free trade zone, economic union,
agreement relating to avoidance of double taxation or for
facilitating frontier trade.106

The second generation, which is the China-Ethiopia BIT,
modifies this in only one way: It adds “fair” to “equitable” in the
first paragraph to read “fair and equitable treatment.” Given the
level of investment disputes involving MFN, particularly the
principle of fair and equitable treatment over the years, the
omission of “fair” cannot be completely without legal
significance.
The most recent BIT—China-Madagascar—modifies the
treatment provision in many respects. Not only does it add
national treatment in express language,107 it also elaborates the
106. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 3.
107. See China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 4(1) (“Without prejudice to its
laws and regulations, each Contracting State shall accord to investments, and activities
of investments of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less favorable
than that accorded to the investment of its own investors or to investors of any third
State, if the treatment is more favorable.”).
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fair and equitable and MFN provisions in more ways than one.
First, it identifies the standard by which the fair and equitable
principle is judged, namely, “in accordance with the principles
of international law.”108 It also adds that such fair and equitable
treatment “shall not be impeded in laws or in fact.”109 Because it
is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of the last part, the
parties have added guidance. The next provision reads:
Legal or de facto obstacles to the fair and equitable
treatment mainly mean, but not limited to: non-equitable
treatment of all kinds of restrictions on the means of
production and management, non-equitable treatment of
all kinds of restrictions on sale of products at home and
broad, as well as other measures with similar effect. But
measures for reasons of security, public order, health,
ethical and environmental protection and other reasons,
these measures shall not be regarded as obstacles.110

This provision is unusually detailed for a fair and equitable
treatment provision because it attempts, perhaps unsuccessfully,
to identify measures that are and are not considered denial of
fair and equitable treatment.111 It is clear that it is a specially
108. Id. art. 3(1).
109. Id.
110. Id. art. 3(3).
111. One of the most recent of the Chinese BITs on the UNCTAD Database
(2006) is the one with Latvia. That BIT contains standard language of Fair and
equitable, Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) and National Treatment. It is reproduced
below for ease of reference:
Article 3 TREATMENT OF INVESTMENT
1. Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall all the time be
accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other
Contracting Party.
2. Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, each Contracting party
shall accord to investments and activities with such investments by the
investors of the other Contraction Party treatment not less favorable than that
accorded to the investments and associated activities by its own investors.
3. Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting
Party to treatment less favorable than that accorded to the investments and
associated activities by the investors of any third State.
4. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting
Party treatment, which is the most favorable of those stipulated in paragraph
2 and paragraph 3 of this Article.
5. The provisions of Paragraphs 3 of this Article shall not be construed so
as to oblige one Contracting Party to extend to the investors of the other
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negotiated provision because of specific concerns. Nonetheless,
it does not fundamentally change the character of this BIT as an
integral part of Chinese third generation BITs.
3. Expropriation
The expropriation provisions of all three BITs are
formulated differently, although the substance is more or less
the same. The China-Ghana BIT is formulated in permissive
language: “Either Contracting Party may, for the national
security and public interest, expropriate, nationalize or take
similar measures . . . .”112 The limitations are “(a) under
domestic legal procedure; (b) without discrimination; (c)
payment of compensation.” The compensation, which must be
“paid without delay,” has to be equivalent to the value of the
property at the taking.113 Further, if the investor contests the
legality of the expropriation under the laws of the taking state, it
may request a review by the authorities of that state.114 Moreover,
if the loss occurs as a result of emergent circumstances such as
war or other types of unrest, the investor would be treated no
less favorably than “a third state.”115 Although this is not a
complete rejection of the Hull Rule, it is certainly less protective.
While it appears to be indicative of the then existing Chinese
view on the right to property and the extent of tolerance for
government intervention as well as its position as the recipient
of foreign direct investment from the West, a look at some of the
BITs that it signed with Western counties almost contradicts this
Contracting Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by
virtue of:
(a) any customs union, free trade zone, economic union, monetary union
and any international agreement resulting in such unions, or similar
institutions;
(b) any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly
to taxation;
(c) any arrangements for facilitating small scale frontier trade in border
areas.
Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Latvia, Apr. 15, 2004 [hereinafter China-Latvia BIT], available at http://
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/China_Latvia.pdf.
112. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 4(1).
113. Id. art. 4(1)–(2).
114. Id. art. 4(3).
115. Id. art. 4(4).

2014]

CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT TREATIES

1061

conclusion. For example, the China-Sweden BIT contains
language more protective of investment than the China-Ghana
BIT. The relevant potion of the China-Sweden BIT reads:
Neither Contracting State shall expropriate or nationalize,
or take any similar measure in regard to investment made in
its territory by an investor of the other Contracting State,
except in the public interest, under due process of law and
against compensation, the purpose of which shall be to
place the investor in the same financial position as the
investor would have been in had the expropriation or
nationalization not taken place.116

This rule, apparently the codification of the Chorzow
Factory rule,117 which is sometimes said to be a rule of customary
international law, is supplemented by a subsection, which
accounts for lost current income and proceeds of liquidated
assets.118 This is one of many indications that not only did China
not strictly use a particular model in each corresponding era,
but also that its BITs do not support the conclusion that it
systematically pursued its North-South and South-South
negotiations with discernible avaricious objectives. In the above
example, at that time, it would have made perfect sense for
China to use the China-Sweden expropriation language, which
is arguably more protective of investment, in its BIT with Ghana.
It is difficult to think that it was a function of Ghana’s
negotiating position at that time. The argument that China
probably did not have a systematic, coherent, and purely selfinterested BIT program similar to the United States will be
developed further.
The China-Ethiopia BIT expropriation provision changes
the “Either Contracting Party may expropriate” language of the
China-Ghana BIT to
Neither Contracting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or
take similar measures (hereinafter referred to as
(‘expropriate’) against investment of the investors of the
other Contracting Party in its territory, unless the following
conditions are met: (a) for the public interest; b) under
116. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 101, art. 3(1).
117. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13)
(requiring full restitution).
118. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 101, art. 3(2).
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domestic legal procedure; (c) without discrimination; (d)
against compensation.119

The compensation, which must be paid without delay, would be
equal to the value of the investment at the time of the
expropriation.120 This BIT omits the war or conflict
compensation provision altogether.
The China-Madagascar BIT changed the language in many
different ways. Most notably, it does not even begin with
expropriation or nationalization. It begins with a general
investment protection statement: “Investments made by
investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other
Contracting Party shall enjoy the full and comprehensive
protection and security.”121 It then uses the more common
“Neither—shall” language but elaborates the exceptions: “(a)
adopting measures for public interests under good legal
framework; (b) without discrimination and not contrary to the
commitments of the Contracting Parties; (c) against fair
compensation when adopting the measures.”122 In terms of the
determination of fair compensation, it adds that it has to be
equivalent to the value of the expropriated investment
“immediately before [its taking] became public knowledge.”123
It further requires the payment of interest, which shall accrue
from taking to actual payment.124 This appears to be China’s
latest formulation of the expropriation provision. The language
is more or less consistent with other Chinese BITs signed during
this period.125
119. China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 4(1).
120. Id. art. 4(2).
121. China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 5(1).
122. Id. art. 5(2).
123. Id. art. 5(3).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., China-Latvia BIT, supra note 111, art. 4. Article 4 reads:
1. Neither Contacting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or take other
similar measures (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) against the
investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party in its territory,
unless all the following conditions are met:
(a) for the public interests;
(b) under domestic legal procedure;
(c) without discrimination;
(d) against compensation
2. The compensation mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
equivalent to the value of the expropriated investments immediately before
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4. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The investor-state dispute settlement provisions of the
earliest BIT, namely China-Ghana, do not contain a special rule
on the settlement of disputes other than the quantum of
compensation.126 Presumably, any dispute other than the
quantum of compensation would be settled through the
domestic legal process of the respective state. The quantum may
be submitted to arbitration. Although it could be ad hoc, the
default rule grants the chairman of the Arbitration Institute of
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce appointment
authority,127 presumably because of Sweden’s perceived political
neutrality at the time. Once constituted, the tribunal is given the
option to use the rules of procedure of the Stockholm center or
ICSID.128 It is interesting to note that ICSID is mentioned even
in the earliest of Chinese BITs, albeit limited to the potential use
of its procedural rules.
The China-Ethiopia BIT elaborated the investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism in at least six ways. First, it
explicitly stated that either party may submit a claim to the
domestic court of the state receiving the investment. Second, it
opened the option for either party to submit disputes relating to
the quantum of compensation to either an ad hoc or ICSID
arbitration once both have become members of ICSID. Third, it
shifted the appointment authority from the chair of the
Stockholm Arbitration Institute to the Secretary General of
ICSID. Fourth, it limited the options that the arbitrators have in
selecting the rules of procedure to ICSID—although it did not
completely take away the arbitrators’ discretion in selecting
other rules. Fifth, it included a choice of law provision. The
chosen laws include the domestic laws of the host state
(including its conflict of laws), the BIT itself, and “recognized
the expropriation is taken or the impending expropriation becomes public
knowledge, whichever is earlier. The value shall be determined in accordance
with generally recognized principles of valuation. The compensation shall be
in a freely convertible currency. The compensation shall include interest at a
normal commercial rate from the date of expropriation until the date of
payment. The compensation shall also be made without delay, be effectively
realizable and freely transferable.
126. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 10(1).
127. Id. art. 10(2).
128. Id. art 10(3).
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principles of international law accepted by both Contracting
Parties.” Finally, it added a provision on the allocation of cost,
specifically providing that the parties bear the cost in equal
proportion.129
The China-Madagascar BIT, while preserving the ICSID
option, limited the choice to the investor by replacing the
“either party” with the “at the request of the investor
concerned” subject to the exhaustion of local administrative
remedies.130 It also expressly provided that the awards shall be
enforced under the ICSID Convention i.e., as if it were the
domestic court judgment of the Contracting State.131 It further
provided that “[d]uring the arbitration process or enforcement
of arbitral awards, the Contracting Party related to the dispute
shall not hold that the investor has received partial or total
insurance compensation as defense.”132
From the above discussion, it seems clear that the latest
one—China-Madagascar—contains the hallmarks of a NorthSouth BIT, with greater protection given to the investor, which
is almost exclusively Chinese; however, as the above discussion
shows, it cannot be concluded that China-Africa BITs, as might
be expected, are systematically or progressively acquiring a
North-South character. If anything, unlike the United States, the
analysis suggests that China has not pursued a strict and
intentional model-based BIT negotiations which reflects its
growing negotiating power. It is not clear whether this is because
of benevolence, cultural preference, tactical approach, or sheer
incoherence. There is almost no doubt, however, that the one
way flow of investment and China’s ever growing influence and
negotiating power would present temptations and challenges
that could affect the durability of the investment relations. The
remedy for such challenges would be duly negotiated
investment treaties, which uniformly contain minimum
standards that protect the environment and good order of the
129. China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 9(1)–(8). It is important to note that
China almost never uses “customary international law” in its treaties, instead adopting
the “principles of international law accepted by both parties.” See Congyan, supra note
72, at 461.
130. China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 10(2).
131. See id. art. 10(3).
132. Id. art. 10(4).
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host community while providing an attractive and conducive
business atmosphere. The following Part identifies and discusses
some contemporary and useful normative prescriptions that
must guide the revitalization of China-Africa investment treaties.
III. MODELING THE CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT REGIME
Despite serious allegations of incoherence in the
jurisprudence of international investment law133 and the debate
about whether it is purely lex specialis,134 a system, a
framework135 or a regime,136 it is clearly inherently North-South
in its origin, formulation, and sustenance. In answering the
frequently asked question of why a trade like multilateral
arrangement eluded international investment, Professor
Salacuse once said that there is a technical and political answer
to the question. The technical one is simple: multilateral
negotiations are difficult to bring to conclusion.137 The political
answer is more interesting: “[g]iven the asymmetric nature of
bilateral negotiations between a strong, developed country and a
usually much weaker developing country, the bilateral setting
allows the developed country to use its power more effectively
than does a multilateral setting, where the power may be much
diluted.”138 Further noting that these divided negotiations would
deprive the developing countries of the opportunity to negotiate
in blocks, he adds a more interesting observation:

133. See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241
(2005); Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009); Susan D.
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005);
Jacques Werner, Making Investment Arbitration More Certain: A Modest Proposal, 4 J.
WORLD INV. 767 (2003) (all discussing the problem of coherence).
134. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 267 (2d
ed. 2004).
135. David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on
Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 513, 516 (2009) (arguing that it is a mistake
to consider it a system; it is a framework and as such the expectation of jurisprudential
coherence might be misguided).
136. See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51
HARV. INT’L . L.J. 427, 467 (2010) (arguing that it is a regime).
137. Id. at 464.
138. Id.
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[w]hereas developed countries would be willing to enter
into bilateral treaties with developing countries for
investment liberalization, knowing full well that few if any
enterprises from the developing country would ever invest
in the developed state, they have been unwilling to enter
into treaties that would grant such liberalization to investors
from other developed states, who could become strong
competitors to the host countries’ own enterprises.139

Although South-South BITs have mushroomed in recent
years,140 their doctrinal foundations are by no means organic to
those relations. Hence the adaptation is not without serious
difficulty. This problem is particularly acute in the China-Africa
context because of China’s ambiguous position as theoretically
South with all the hallmarks of the North in its stature and
pursuit.141 Hence, for the ambitious investment relations to
endure, grow, and bear more fruit, the substantive contents and
the structure of dispute settlement need to be revisited in light
of their own cultural backgrounds and contemporary
developments. This Part identifies some of the most important
contemporary notions that must inform normative and
structural developments in China-Africa investment relations.
A. Contemporary Models in International Investment Law and Their
Impact on China-Africa Investment
Following many years of consultations, the US Department
of State and US Trade Representative (“USTR”) jointly released
the revised 2012 BIT Model on April 20, 2012. The press release
noted that the “Administration made several important changes
to the BIT text [2004 Model] so as to enhance transparency and
public participation; sharpen the disciplines that address
preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises, including the
distortions created by certain indigenous innovation policies;
and strengthen protections relating to labor and the
139. Id. at 465.
140. Currently, many of the about 3000 BITs are South-South. Cf. Country-Specific
Lists of Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/
International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specific-Lists-ofBITs.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
141. For example, it is suggested that Chinese investment approach is being
“Americanized.” Congyan, supra note 72, at 459.
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environment.”142 The new Model addresses cutting-edge issues
in ways that are acceptable to the United States. Another notable
model is the IISD Model, which focuses on sustainable
development and addresses some of the same cutting-edge
topics. They both attempt to establish a balance that they deem
appropriate between investment protection and the host
government’s ability to regulate in the public interest. This Part
examines these models to identify some of the important issues
that China and Africa need to address as they recalibrate their
existing investment regime. The discussion focuses on issues
that are either ignored or inadequately addressed in the exiting
China-Africa treaties including, labor and environment,
corruption and transparency, corporate social responsibility,
and dispute settlement.
1. Labor and Environment
The regulation of labor and the protection of the
environment are two of the most serious contemporary
challenges of the international investment regime. All three
generations of Chinese BITs make no reference to labor and
environment. These issues are increasingly becoming important
in China-Africa investment relations.
a. Labor
Consider this typical scenario: For decades, the Zambian
Copperbelt towns looked like “a shell of [their] lucrative past”143
with “tennis courts and cricket fields once provided and
maintained by Zambian parastatals now overgrown with
weeds.”144 In 1998, the China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining
Corporation (“CNMC”) purchased one of the mines, invested
US$130 million and revitalized it. In 2003, it opened three more
mines and hired more than 6000 Zambian workers with plans to

142. Media Note, Off. of Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States
Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (April 20, 2012), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188198.htm.
143. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU’LL BE FIRED IF YOU REFUSE”: LABOR ABUSES IN
ZAMBIA’S CHINESE STATE-OWNED COPPER MINES 3 (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf.
144. Id.

1068 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1035
hire several thousands more in subsequent years.145 According to
a comprehensive Human Rights Watch Report, after the
Chinese company took over, “[m]ine shafts have been upgraded
with modern equipment, the smelter is deemed state-of-the art,
and computers have replaced pencils in planning.”146 The
Zambian workers there “expressed gratitude to the Chinese
investors for their jobs and the enormous investment being
made.”147
That is not the whole story, however. The Zambian workers
who expressed gratitude also added that “Chinese copper
operations were the country’s worst when it comes to health and
safety.”148 The Human Rights Watch Report accuses the Chinese
company of gross violations of national and international labor
standards including low wages, long working hours without
appropriate overtime pay or other forms of benefits.149 It states
in particular that “[a]t its most extreme, a 2005 explosion at a
Chinese-owned explosives manufacturing plant in Chambishi
killed 46 Zambian workers; the following year, riots in
Chambishi over work conditions culminated in the shooting of
at least five miners, allegedly by a Chinese manager.”150
Significantly, the Report also notes that such labor practices are
“strikingly similar to safety and labor problems that plague
China’s domestic mining industry.”151 Although the Report takes
an exclusively human rights perspective and its motives and
some of its conclusions might be disputed, it is clear that some
labor and employment problems exist. In fact, this might be
taken as an example of what might be happening in other parts
of Africa where Chinese companies invest. Interestingly, not
even the Human Rights Watch Report accuses China of treating
African workers worse than its own citizens who work in the
same industries. This is an interesting fact because it suggests
that whatever labor problems there are, it is probably because of
factors other than discriminatory intent or purpose which makes
the solution that much easier. Although there might be
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 2.

2014]

CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT TREATIES

1069

unexplored domestic legal remedies, they are often insufficient
and labor provisions in BITs could play a significant role in
addressing this problem.
As indicated above, none of the Chinese BITs address labor
issues. Labor issues are sensitive anywhere, and unfortunately,
labor standards have not yet found meaningful express in
existing investment treaties anywhere. Some most contemporary
expressions are contained in US 2012 BIT Model and the IISD
Model.152

152. US 2012 Model BIT, supra note 10, art. 13. Article 13 reads:
Article 13: Investment and Labor
1. The Parties reaffirm their respective obligations as members of the
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and their commitments under the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-Up.
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws.
Accordingly, each Party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise
derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from its labor laws
where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with the labor rights
referred to in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of paragraph 3, or fail to
effectively enforce its labor laws through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory.
3. For purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means each Party’s statutes or
regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following:
(a) freedom of association;
(b) the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(c) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;
(d) the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst
forms of child labor;
(e) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation; and
(f) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work,and occupational safety and health.
4. A Party may make a written request for consultations with the other Party
regarding any matter arising under this Article. The other Party shall respond
to a request for consultations within thirty days of receipt of such request.
Thereafter, the Parties shall consult and endeavor to reach a mutually
satisfactory resolution.
5. The Parties confirm that each Party may, as appropriate, provide
opportunities for public participation regarding any matter arising under this
Article.
Id.
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Although the 2012 Model made significant progress to the
2004 Model by adding paragraphs 1, 4 and 5,153 critics note that
it does not go far enough. The dilemma is obvious: while on the
one hand, states desire to encourage foreign investment, on the
other hand, they want to provide appropriate protection to their
workforce. The dilemma is greater for states who are both
recipients and exporters of capital like the United States and
China. Within the United States, such balance is a serious
political issue. The 2012 Model, released by a democratic
administration, is considered relatively pro labor as compared to
the prior one released under a republican leadership. Be that as
it may, this is an acceptable expression of labor standards. Even
the IISD Model is limited to directly incorporating the
International Labour Organization (“ILO”) standards by
reference.154 The US Model might be a good guide for future
China-Africa BITs as it is evidently a function of significant
153. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 United States Model BIT art.
13, [hereinafter US 2004 Model BIT] available at http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/
Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf. Article 13
reads:
Article 13: Investment and Labor
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws.
Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally
recognized labor rights referred to in paragraph 2 as an encouragement for
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its
territory. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.
2. For purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means each Party’s statutes or
regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following
internationally recognized labor
rights:
(a) the right of association;
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
(d) labor protections for children and young people, including a
minimum age for theemployment of children and the prohibition and
elimination of the worst forms ofchild labor; and
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work,and occupational safety and health.
154. IISD BIT Model, supra note 19, art. 21(D). (“All Parties shall ensure that
their domestic law and policies are consistent with the core labor requirements of the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work, 1998.”).
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compromises on all sides. The impact of more stringent labor
standards on the flow of FDI is obvious but one improvement to
the US Model expression that might be considered is the
replacement of the more permissive “it is inappropriate” with “it
is impermissible” or some such stronger standard.
b. Environment
A recent Financial Times article captured the dilemma
between development and the environment very well when it
touted “Chinese Investment: The money is welcome but more
controls are needed.”155 The article quotes Xiao Yuhua, a
research associate at the Zheijiang Normal University’s Institute
of African Studies as saying: “it’s good for Africa to have Chinese
companies investing. But it’s important to monitor and regulate
them in order to avoid trouble and to create more
opportunities.”156
Environmental issues present a profound dilemma. A case
in point is the controversy surrounding the building of the Gibe
III dam on the Omo River in Southern Ethiopia. When
completed, this US$1.75 billion dam is expected to generate
1870 MW of power. As of 2009, this country of 80 million
produced less than 1000 MW of power. 157 While this dam would
literally more than double its capacity, almost all international
financial institutions refused to provide financing, concerned
about the environmental impact on indigenous populations
living downstream and on Lake Turkana in neighboring
Kenya.158 The Ethiopian government insisted that the benefits of
the dam will more than offset the drawbacks and continued to
build the dam with financial help from the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) and expertise from the
Italian construction firm, Salini.159

155. Xan Rice, Chinese Investment: The Money Is Welcome But More Controls Are
Needed, FIN. TIMES (London) (June 19, 2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/d8f41dd6-b4a6-11e1-bb2e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BZkdDfHe.
156. Id. at 2.
157. See id. at 1.
158. See id. The financial institutions that refused financing include the African
Development Bank (“ADB”), the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank.
159. See id.
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The concern appears to be that Chinese companies are
much more willing to compromise on environmental standards
than their Western counterparts because the latter faces closer
scrutiny at home.160 Professor Ian Taylor of the University of St.
Andrews in Scotland, after indicating the level of hypocrisy on
the part of some Western investors such as oil companies,
suggests that the environmental concerns in China’s Africa
investment are real. But he also points out that the Chinese
companies and government are increasingly becoming sensitive
to their international reputation with this regard.161 Indeed, for
the first time ever, during the November 2012 18th Congress of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, President Hu
Jintao announced “ecological progress” as being one of five
cornerstones of China’s overall modernization drive alongside
economic, political, social and cultural progress.162 He said in
particular: “We must give high priority to making ecological
progress and incorporate it into all aspects and the whole
process of advancing economic, political, cultural, and social
progress, work hard to build a beautiful country, and achieve
lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese nation.”163
Such high level political recognition and calls for
incorporating environmental standards in all aspects of
development clearly require the development and application of
legal standards domestically and internationally. Legal standards
enshrined in investment treaties are immensely helpful in
resolving environmental issues because at the very least, they
would define the rights and responsibilities of the host state and
the investor and delineate expectations on both sides. Given the
serious environmental concerns in the many areas of Chinese
investment in Africa,164 defining the environmental standards in
investment treaties is not only critical but also feasible and
politically expedient given China’s increasing concern over
environmental issues at home. None of the existing BITs do so.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Hu Outlines “Overall Approach” for China’s Modernization Drive, Stresses Scientific
Development, XINHUA NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/c_131959824.htm
163. Id.
164. See Rice, supra note 155 (addressing concerns such as mining, hydroelectric
power projects, illegal logging, and smuggling of ivory and rhino horns).
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A look at the contemporary standards would be very important
in crafting the acceptable levels of compromise. The new 2012
US BIT Model’s environmental provision is elaborate—as such
could be instructive.165
Although it is still considered inadequate by many, this
provision made significant changes to the previous BIT Model
by adding paragraphs 3 to 7.166 Given the increasing seriousness
165. U.S. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 10, art. 12. Article 12 of the 2012 Model
reads:
Article 12: Investment and Environment
1. The Parties recognize that their respective environmental laws and
policies, and multilateral environmental agreements to which they are both
party, play an important role in protecting the environment.
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental
laws. Accordingly, each Party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise
derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from its environmental
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those
laws, or fail to effectively enforce those laws through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory.
3. The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise
discretion with respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and
prosecutorial matters, and to make decisions regarding the allocation of
resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters
determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand
that a Party is in compliance with paragraph 2 where a course of action or
inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources.
....
5. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with
this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.
6. A Party may make a written request for consultations with the other Party
regarding any matter arising under this Article. The other Party shall respond
to a request for consultations within thirty days of receipt of such request.
Thereafter, the Parties shall consult and endeavor to reach a mutually
satisfactory resolution.”).
7. The Parties confirm that each Party may, as appropriate, provide
opportunities for public participation regarding any matter arising under this
Article.
Id.
166. Compare id., with U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 153, art 12. Article 12 of
the 2004 Model reads:
Article 12: Investment and Environment
1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental
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of environmental concerns, its inadequacy appears clear when
compared with the IISD Model, which contains a more robust
environmental provision.167
The IISD Model has many features that make it more
suitable for China-Africa relations. First, unlike many other
models, including the latest US Model, it links investment with
sustainable development of the host state. Although this is not a
strange notion in international investment law,168 its expression
here is very instructive. Sustainability is vitally important to
laws.12 Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those
laws as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or
retention of an investment in its territory. If a Party considers that the other
Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with
the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any
such encouragement.
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with
this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”
167. IISD BIT Model, supra note 19, art. 21. It reads in pertinent part:
Article 21: Minimum standards for environmental, labour and human
rights protection
(A) Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own level of
domestic environmental protection and its own sustainable development
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify its environmental laws and
regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for
high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to
improve those laws and regulations.
(B) Each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high
levels of labour and human rights protection appropriate to its economic and
social situation, and shall strive to continue to improve these laws and
regulations.
(C) All Parties shall have, as a soon as practicable, a domestic
environmental impact assessment law and social impact assessment law that
meets the minimum standards adopted by the Conference of the Parties on
these matters.
....
(E) All parties shall ensure that their laws, policies and actions are
consistent with the international human rights agreements to which they are
a Party and, at a minimum, as soon as practicable with the list of human
rights obligations and agreements to be adopted by the first meeting of the
Parties.”
Id.

168. See, e.g., Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609, 622 (2003).
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Africa. As indicated above, Chinese companies have large scale
investments in the extractive industries where environmental
issues are likely to lead to serious contentions. A clear
expression of expectations is essential. Second, it requires the
parties to improve their environmental laws and regulations. In
other words, it jointly holds them to higher environmental
standards. That is particularly important in China-Africa
relations where the development of environmental laws and the
mechanisms of their enforcement may not be as developed as in
the United States and other Western countries. The inclusion of
such environmental requirements in BITs that China signs with
African states is doubly beneficial because it helps China
improve its laws, which could be applied to foreign investors in
China, and also helps African states improve their
environmental laws to protect their environment without
imposing unreasonable restrictions that are not equally
recognized in China. Finally, it sets minimum standards by
linking the environmental regulations to recognized human
rights standards. This is particularly important in projects that
affect large numbers of indigenous communities.
c. Corruption and Transparency
China and all African states with the exception of Botswana
have a failing mark on Transparency International’s (“TI”)
public sector corruption perception index.169 All of Africa’s
traditional partners from the West seem to have reasonably
weakened the public corruption plague.170 According to the
World Bank, public officials take about US$1 trillion in bribes
every year with another US$1.5 trillion dollars paid to unduly
influence procurement decisions.171 It is fair to assume that
much of that money comes from western multinationals but it is
also clear that Chinese companies are increasing their share on
that front. For example, a recent TI report ranks Chinese firms
169. While China ranks 80th, most African states rank below that. See Corruption
Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/
results
170. See id. All western European countries, Canada and the United States rank
very well on the scale.
171. Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International
Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL IN’T’L L.J. 691, 692 & n.4 (2007).
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towards the bottom of the transparency scale. Out of the world’s
105 largest companies on the ranking scale, the highest ranked
Chinese company claimed the sixty-ninth spot.172 Out of twentyfour major financial firms, the bottom three spots were taken by
Chinese banks, namely, China Construction Bank Corp, Bank of
Communications Co., and Bank of China Ltd. The total value of
all the ranked firms is approximately US$11 trillion.173 The
Chinese news source that carried the report concluded: “In the
anti-corruption program rankings (100 percent indicating full
transparency), the transparency of Bank of China and Bank of
Communications was 0 percent . . . .”174 Indeed, European
business partners also complain about the opacity of Chinese
business culture. For example, the European Ambassador to
China recently said that “Europe’s trade with China is being
stymied by barriers including a lack of transparency and opaque
business environment.”175
Public perception surveys in China also rate the business
sector as the most corrupt sector followed by the police.176 On
the question of which country’s businesses are more likely to
bribe abroad (i.e., bribe payers index) out of the twenty-eight
largest FDI exporters, China ranked second to last, next only to
Russia.177 Although TI does not have a bribe receiver’s index,
based on rankings on the perception of public corruption
index, it is easy to see that most African countries would rank
high on the receiving end.178 As far as transparency and
corruption is concerned, therefore, based on these reports,
China-Africa business deals appear to be particularly vulnerable
to corruption, which presents great obstacles to successful, long172. Qu Yi, Report Shows Chinese Banks Lack Transparency, CHINA.ORG.CN (July 13,
2012), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-07/13/content_25903847.htm.
173. See id.
174. Id. The full interactive index is available at Visualising the Bribe Payers Index
2011, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/interactive/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2014) (listing the Netherlands as the least likely to bribe, the United
States at number 10, and South Africa at 15 on the 1 to 28 scale).
175. Richard Quest, Unlocking China’s business potential, CNN (June 28, 2012, 3:24
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/world/europe/europe-eu-china-trade/
index.html.
176. Fighting Corruption in China, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 8, 2012),
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/fighting_corruption_in_china
177. Id.
178. See generally Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, supra note 169.
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lasting, broadly, and mutually beneficial partnership. For the
economic relations to mature and take proper root, the
investment legal framework has to address the issue of
corruption and transparency in a meaningful way.
The political will to address this important issue appears to
be present. As a recent Financial Times editorial noted, “Libya
and Sudan show that the days when Beijing could be indifferent
to corrupt or dysfunctional government in Africa are over.”179
Indeed, during the 18th National Congress of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (“CPC”), President
Hu Jintao said “If we fail to handle this issue [corruption] well,
it could prove fatal to the Party, and even cause the collapse of
the Party and the fall of the state.”180 Significantly, a February
2011 amendment to the Chinese Criminal Code expressly makes
the offering of bribes to foreign public officials for the purpose
of acquiring “illegitimate business benefits” criminal conduct,
punishable by law.181
Although corruption is difficult to define and even more so
to verify, its negative impacts on investment and economic
progress are without dispute.182 Today, multinational
corporations and their hosts are constrained by a patchwork of
domestic and international legal instruments.183 The principal
one is the United Nations Convention against Corruption.184
China and nearly all African states have ratified this

179. Editorial, China into Africa, FIN. TIMES (July 19, 2012, 7:20 PM)
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80ac1cd8-d1a6-11e1-bbbc-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz2BZkdDfHe.
180. CPC Pledges Unremitting Efforts to Combat Corruption, XINHUA NEWS (Nov. 8,
2012, 10:38 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/
c_131959538.htm.
181. For a good description of Chinese anti-bribery laws including recent
amendments, see ANTI-CORRUPTION REGULATION IN 51 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 58–
64 (Homer E. Moyer Jr. ed., 2011), available at http://www.squiresanders.com/files/
Publication/bc0b156f-f1de-4eb1-9553-9a35e5e43a44/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/c0a57610-6e13-49af-8df2-9d911d146dc2/AC2011%20China.pdf.
182. Snider & Kidane, supra note 171, at 695–96.
183. For a detailed discussion of domestic and international anti-corruption legal
instruments in comparative context, see id. at 700–15.
184. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 7, 2003).
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convention.185 Although its implementation presents enormous
challenges, the standards it sets are useful for China-Africa
investment treaties. The term corruption does not appear in the
latest US BIT Model; however, the IISD Model has duly
incorporated the basic standards of the UN anti-Corruption
Convention in Article 13,186 and adds some more beneficial
standards.187 Article 32 of the same model also obligates the
home states to adopt and enforce laws criminalizing the same
conduct when done by their citizens—natural as well as
juridical.188
The inclusion of these provisions is not only important but
also easy to do in any future China-Africa investment treaties
because these are not new obligations as China and almost all
African states have already assumed the same obligations under
185. U.N. Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of
29 November 2013, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005). The
exceptions are Chad, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Id.
186. Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. [IISD], IISD Model International Agreement
on Investment for Sustainable Development art. 13 (Apr. 2005). It reads:
(A) Investors and their investments shall not, prior to the establishment of
an investment or afterwards, offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a public
official of the host state, for that official or for a third party, in order that the
official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to achieve any favor in relation to a
proposed investment or any licenses, permits, contracts or other rights in
relation to an investment.
(B) Investors and their investments shall not be complicit in any act
described in Paragraph (A), including incitement, aiding and abetting, and
conspiracy to commit or authorization of such acts.
187. Id. art. 22. It reads:
All host states shall ensure that
(A) the offering, solicitation or acceptance of an offer, promise or gift of
any pecuniary or other nature, whether directly or through intermediaries, to
any public official of the host state, for that official or for a third party, in
order that the official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to
the performance of official duties to achieve any favor in relation to a
proposed investment or any licenses, permits, contracts or other rights in
relation to an investment; and
(B) any acts complicit in any act described in Paragraph (A), including
incitement, aiding and abetting, conspiracy to commit or authorization of
such acts; shall be made criminal offences in the host state and subject to
appropriate criminal enforcement and sanctions. Host states shall make every
effort to prosecute such activities in accordance with domestic law.
188. Id. art. 32.
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the UN Convention.189 Their inclusion in investment treaties has
several advantages, however: first, it reminds and reinforces the
obligations on all sides, and second, perhaps more importantly,
it facilitates the enforcement of the obligations as a part of
investor-state dispute settlement. If, for example, a host state
fails to prosecute a public official who solicits a bribe from an
investor, the investor could potentially seek redress for violation
of the anti-corruption provisions in the investment treaty.
The US Model contains elaborate provisions on
transparency; however, the concerns these provisions address
are somewhat different from directly fighting the kind of
corruption that the IISD Model envisions. The US Model’s
transparency concern is basically transparency in rulemaking
and adjudication of matters that potentially affect foreign
investment, i.e., publication of laws and decisions affecting
investment.190 Although transparency of such kind is absolutely
essential for conducive business environment, as far as ChinaAfrica investment relations are concerned, the more acute
problem, which is not covered by other provisions, would be the
kind of corruption that the IISD Model addresses.
d. Corporate Social Responsibility
The term “corporate social responsibility” does not appear
in any of the US BIT Models and the most recent one is no
exception. The IISD Model contains a provision that defines
corporate social responsibility in very broad terms.191 This
189. As indicated above, Chinese domestic criminal code criminalizes the offering
of bribe to foreign public officials, which is the corner stone of the UN anti-corruption
Convention. Most of the African states are also parties to the African anti-corruption
Convention. U.N. Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as
of 29 November 2013, supra note 185. For a discussion of this convention, see Snider &
Kidane, supra note 171, at 711–15.
190. U.S. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 10, arts. 10–11.
191. IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable
Development, supra note 186, art. 16(A)-(C). The pertinent part reads:
(A) In addition to the obligation to comply with all applicable laws and
regulations of the host state and the obligations in this Agreement, and in
accordance with the size, capacities and nature of an investment, and taking
into account the development plans and priorities of the host state, the
Millennium Development Goals and the indicative list of key responsibilities
provided in Annex F, investors and their investments should strive to make
the maximum feasible contributions to the sustainable development of the
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provision incorporates the ILO Tripartite Declaration on
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy192 and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.193
Admittedly, the IISD Model is too broad to include in a
negotiated BIT. The OECD Guidelines, which are non-binding,
contain principles in such areas as human rights, employment
and industrial relations, the environment, corruption, consumer
interest, science and technology, competition, and taxation.194
It might be difficult to agree on the details of all of these
areas in investment treaties, however, the minimum standards in
the area of labor, the environment, and corruption and
transparency discussed in sections a, b and c above are vital in
any future China-Africa investment treaties. China and Africa
negotiations must also be informed by the maturing ILO and
OECD Guidelines as suggested by the IISD Model. Indeed, the
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China Africa
Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015) expressly
promises that “The Chinese government will continue to guide
Chinese enterprises to actively fulfill social responsibilities and
give back to the local communities.”195 These promises need at
some point be written into binding treaties in a mutually
acceptable manner.

host state and local community through high levels of socially responsible
practices.
(B) Investors should apply the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, as well as specific or sectoral standards of responsible practice
where these exist.
(C) Where standards of corporate social responsibility increase, investors
should strive to apply and achieve the higher level standards.”
192. Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (4th ed. 2006), available at http://
www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm.
193. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/
guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf.
194. See id. (defining the relevant scope of these concepts).
195. Fifth FOCAC Action Plan, supra note 43.
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e. Dispute Settlement
Dispute settlement is a key component of investment
treaties because in many cases, domestic judicial systems are not
well equipped to resolve investor-state disputes reliably,
neutrally, equitably, and definitively. As discussed in Part II.B.4
above, the dispute settlement provisions in China-Africa BITs
have evolved from domestic court litigation in the host state with
only the quantum of compensation potentially referred to ad
hoc arbitration,196 to open access, for both the host state and
investor, to international arbitration, ad hoc or institutional,
including ICSID without limitation of the subject matter197 at the
discretion of the investor.198
The dispute settlement provisions in these BITs had for
decades largely lain dormant because the scale and magnitude
of Chinese investment in Africa were not so high as to produce
too many disputes requiring formal resolution. As Chinese
investments in Africa increase and mature, disputes will also
undoubtedly increase. There is no doubt that many disputes are
already emerging out of Chinese investments made in the last
decade. A mutually acceptable and effective dispute settlement
mechanism is absolutely essential. The dispute resolution
mechanisms contained in the existing BITs are fragmented and
lack proper guidance to the investor as well as the host state.
The existing levels and prospects of Chinese investment in
Africa require an ingenious, mutually beneficial, culturally
appropriate, and dynamic dispute resolution mechanism.
At this point in time, saying that international arbitration is
a better means of investment dispute settlement is stating the
obvious when the alternative is domestic court litigation.
Working out the details of international arbitration is the more
difficult question. This question is more acute for China and
Africa for the following reasons. First, international investment
arbitration as a modern means of transnational dispute
resolution has developed in North-South relations predicated on
western legal thought. Its Washington-London-Paris-Stockholm

196. See, e.g., China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 10.
197. See, e.g., China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 9.
198. See. e.g., China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 10.
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roots and modus operandi are unmistakable.199 Those venues
are still the custodians of the important institutions and
expertise. China and all African states are cultural strangers to
these venues.200 The venues, as mere physical locations alone,
may not present serious difficulties; the problem lies in the lack
of proper representation of both China and Africa on the
arbitral panels and other important secretariat positions in
almost all of these institutions.201 That raises the more important
question of whether ICSID or the other leading arbitral
institutions in their current compositions are suitable fora for
China-Africa investment dispute settlement. As one of the
writers concluded elsewhere based on a border inquiry, the
existing institutions have significant shortcomings in handling
China-Africa investment disputes in a neutral, cost-effective, and
culturally appropriate manner.202 For example, as far as ICSID is
concerned, which is the most relevant institution for purposes of
investment disputes, a look at its half-a-century of arbitral justice
shows its quintessentially North-South stature. The publically
available ICSID statistics tell the whole story: while more than
twenty percent of all ICSID cases involved African States,203 only
two percent of the arbitrators and conciliators have been from
Sub-Saharan Africa.204 By contrast, about seventy percent of all
the arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc committee members
have been West Europeans or North Americans while the
number of Western European respondents in these proceedings
199. The leading institutions are ICSID, the London Court of International
Arbitration (“LCIA”), see LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, http://
www.lcia.org/ (last visited May 1, 2014); the Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), see COURT OF ARBITRATION OF THE INT’L CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr (last
visited May 1, 2014); and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), see
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.chamber.se/the-scc-institute.aspx
(last visited May 1, 2014).
200. See KIDANE, supra note 8, at 270–393 (detailing the law, cultures, and
economics of the world’s leading arbitral institutions and the position of China and
Africa).
201. See id. (providing useful statistics and citations for each profiled institution).
202. Id. at 393.
203. ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS 11 (2012) [hereafter ICSID 2012
Statistics], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=
English31.
204. Id. at 16.
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has been less than one percent.205 Having not participated in
ICSID proceedings for years, in recent times, China appears to
be taking part in a few cases. For example, a Chinese insurance
group has recently initiated an arbitral proceeding against
Belgium.206 Based on the limited information available, it is
interesting to note that the Chinese company is represented by
Kirkland & Ellis International out of London and Chicago, and
the two arbitrators appointed so far are from England and New
Zealand.207
It is not fair to attribute a serious lack of diversity to all
other western institutions—especially the International
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). According to the most recent
ICC statistical report, in 2011, it received about 796 cases from
139 countries. Hearings were conducted in 63 countries, and
about 78 nationalities were represented in arbitral panels.208 Be
that as it may, the cultural and other barriers that China and
Africa would face in the West are still undeniable. A simple look
at the composition of even the ICC International Court of
Arbitration shows no Chinese and only one African out of
eighteen members.209 To the extent these institutions make a
conscious effort to address the democracy and cultural deficit,
they could be suitable on a case by case basis, however, China
and Africa must also consider the alternative of designing their
own institution particularly for the resolution of investment
disputes, which often involve vital issues of public concern.
As one of the authors suggested in more detail elsewhere,210
an arbitral institution within the framework of FOCAC could be
particularly suitable. While the details need to be negotiated,
once an agreement is made on the nature, location and
205. Id. at 11, 16.
206. Ping An Life Ins. Co. of China, Ltd. & Ping An Ins. (Grp.) Co. of China, Ltd.
v. Kingdom of Belg., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 (Feb. 26, 2013).
207. Id. Further information is available on ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet.
208. The ICC Report itself is subscription based (US$1200), but a summary of the
statistics is available on the ICC Website at Statistics, INT’L CHAMBER COM.,
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/
Introduction-to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics (last visited April 9, 2014).
209. List of Court Members, Int’l Chamber Com., http://www.iccwbo.org/AboutICC/Organization/Dispute-Resolution-Services/ICC-International-Court-ofArbitration/List-of-Current-Court-Members (last visited April 9, 2014).
210. Kidane, supra note 8, ch. 15.
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procedures of this FOCAC institution, China and African states
could begin referencing it in their future investment treaties as
an alternative forum for dispute settlement. Along the lines of
the IISD Model, the most important characteristics of the
FOCAC affiliated institution must include escalation procedures
where alternatives to binding arbitration are adequately
explored. Other considerations must include the location of the
subject matter of the dispute in selecting the seat, diversity and
proper cultural representation on the panels, transparency,
appellate discipline, and effective mechanism of enforcement.211
A dispute settlement body imbued with these features under the
auspices of FOCAC could provide a good alternative in ChinaAfrica investment relations. The details would obviously need to
be negotiated.
CONCLUSION
China and Africa face extraordinary challenges in ordering
their economic relations—particularly their investment
relations—by law. This Article has outlined several of these
challenges. These challenges may be summarized as follows:
first, through a complex mix of historical circumstances, they
have been required to adapt and utilize normative and
institutional apparatus created for a different purpose i.e.,
North-South, more specifically, West-East, West-Africa, and WestLatin America relations. Second, the problem of adaptability has
been exasperated by fundamental doctrinal and cultural
differences. More specifically, in terms of doctrinal diversity,
whereas Chinese and most African societies largely maintain a
different understanding of the function of private property, they
are confronted with investment norms imbued with classic
western ideologies. While on the one hand, they recognize that
these norms have a history of success in ordering economic
relations, on the other hand, they are confronted with the
economic inequities enabled by the same norms. To make
matters worse, there is more than a grain of suspicion between
them that the stronger party might be desirous of employing
such norms to its advantage. At the cultural level, while the
211. As far as enforcement is concerned, both the ICSID and New York
Convention models could be instructive.
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preference for harmony and non-binding soft norms pervades
both the Chinese and most African legal cultures, through
decades of interaction with the West, they have come to
appreciate the virtues of predictability and uniformity that
binding norms often bring. Their dilemma on this front is more
acute when it comes to dispute settlement. Whereas the total
allocation of blame rather than the restoration of order and
harmony as the objective of dispute settlement is something that
they have struggled to internalize down through the decades,
they also recognize that pragmatism in today’s business
environment might demand adaptability to cross cultural
notions and dominant means of resolution of disputes. It is with
this background that this Article recommends the systematic
revision and adoption of a modern and mutually beneficial and
culturally appropriate China-African investment regime backed
by a robust dispute settlement mechanism.
The existing BITs have significant shortcomings—indeed,
they are all outdated. This conclusion includes the third
generation of Chinese BITs exemplified by the ChinaMadagascar BIT discussed above. In short, the first two
generations are outdated because they are not informed by
modern developments in such areas as scope and admission,
treatment, expropriation, dispute settlement, but more
importantly, they totally omit prescriptions in such fundamental
areas as labor, environment, corruption and transparency and
generally corporate social responsibility. The last model is also
already outdated for many of the above reasons but more
curiously, it is outdated because it has some notable hallmarks of
a North-South BIT, which could be a troubling trend. For
China-Africa investment relations to overcome the challenges
and continue the current trajectories of growth unhampered,
their investment treaties must not ignore contemporary norms
that link investment to sustainable development. They must also
critically appraise the shortcomings of the existing mechanisms
of dispute settlement and seriously consider an alternative
mutually acceptable and culturally appropriate institutional
mechanism for the resolution of their disputes.
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